Int’l community against Trump’s opposition to JCPOA

Mohseni who is the Iran Project Director and Fellow for Iran Studies at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, made the remarks in a recent exclusive interview with IRNA. 

He is also a Lecturer on Government in the Department of Government at Harvard University, where he teaches Iranian and Middle East politics, and the Co-Chair of the Eastern Mediterranean and Europe Study Group at Harvard’s Center for European Studies.

Mohseni believes since many of Trump’s policies are not clearly formed yet, he “will need to be more realistic of what he can accomplish and how to do so' once he assumes office.

“Trump’s Iran policies are still very uncertain but a lot of his staff, advisers, and constituency are very anti-Iran and were staunchly opposed to the JCPOA. It will be unlikely for Trump to tear up the agreement, but he will look to renegotiating aspects of the deal with Iran,” Dr. Mohseni argued.

He said, “US policy options against Iran are constrained, and neither military action nor sanctions will have much marginal benefit. It depends on Trump’s larger vision of dealing with Iran. On one hand, this may mean greater antagonism towards Iran, but on the other, it may mean Trump is interested in opening up Iran to US businesses and industry.”

The Iranian scholar also talked about Trump’s policies in the Middle East, the way he would deal with the international agreements including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and NAFTA and also the impact of disclosing emails of his Democrat rival Hillary Clinton on his victory.

Commenting on Trump's international policies as well as the changes appeared in his positions before and after his election, Mohseni said, 'While there is ambiguity regarding the specific policies that President-elect Trump will adopt once he assumes the presidency, Trump’s style of decision making will not change. He might become more flexible on some issues, as he has hinted on doing for Obamacare for example, however his constituency is not going to change, his worldview is not going to change, and his domestic critics are largely not going to change. Because many of Trump’s policies are not clearly formed yet and he did not have a specific detailed platform of policies during the election campaign, he has a bit of a freer hand for how his individual policies are going to evolve once he assumes office. This means that in order for his policies to be effective given the larger constraints of the American political system and international politics, Trump will need to be more realistic of what he can accomplish and how to do so once he is in office.'

As for the outcome present oppositions made by Americans against Trump and the country's electoral system, Mohseni said, 'A large segment of the American population will always be very critical of President-elect Trump. That will not necessarily be reflected in street demonstrations throughout his presidency -- these current demonstrations following his election will likely be short lived. However, the extent to which opposition galvanizes into a more cohesive protest force will depend on Trump’s future policies. If he carries out polarizing policies such as mass deportations or clampdowns on civil liberties, more discontent will emerge. Right now, the American population is divided and regardless of who had won the elections, the President would have needed to unify the country due to the large amount of anger by common Americans at the political establishment. If Trump continues to perpetuate rhetoric that negatively targets Americans based on their ethnicities or religious affiliation, political discontent will continue and polarization will grow worse especially if some of the actual policies Trump has suggested are enacted.

'It is not very likely that there will be a change in the electoral system of the United States, and if there is movement in that direction, it will be a very slow and drawn-out process. This is especially the case since Republicans now have control of both houses of Congress as well as the Presidency, and it is largely Republicans who back many of the current electoral laws. The Republican Party has a history for supporting smaller state rights and making voter access and registration laws more difficult, which reduce popular turnout and in turn tends to favor the Republicans.'


Commenting on members of Trump's administration and their positions vis-a-vis the Middle East and Iran in general, Mohseni said, 'There is a serious question about how Trump can reincorporate some of the main policymakers and elites of the Republican establishment. Trump ran as an outsider with no prior political experience and his views have alienated the mainstream Republican elite. Consequently it’s going to be much more challenging for him to set up a strong team with high expertise for his transition into power. The elites who were not alienated by his politics and who supported Trump are much more likely be more on the ideological-political fringes of the party. Consequently many have hawkish views on Iran and the Middle East even though President-elect Trump’s positions on the Middle East were much more pragmatic during the debates. It will have to be seen how much he sticks to his own policies and how much the new team he assembles affects his policy making. This condition is reflected in Trump’s choice of Reince Priebus, former Republican National Committee Chairman, as his Chief of Staff and Stephen Bannon, the “alt-right” (alternative right) leader of Breitbart News, as his chief strategist and senior counselor. This dual appointment forebodes greater political infighting and ideological gridlock that will impact Trump’s style of governance. 

'While Priebus is a mainstream Republican elite, Bannon is a proponent of a “global tea party movement” and believes there is a crisis of capitalism in the West and a crisis of faith. That this type of capitalism, under the banner of “personal freedoms,” is undermining faith, particularly for the youth. He believes there should be a return to what he calls Judeo-Christian capitalism.'

Referring to the disclosure of emails of Trump's Democrat rival Hillary Clinton and its impact on the outcome of the presidential election, Mohseni said, 'The FBI’s decision to reveal the second batch of Hillary Clinton’s emails was important but not a game-changer in the electoral outcome. The majority of Americans were fully aware of the charges against Clinton and it was not a new revelation per se. Clinton largely fell behind in terms of public likeability, and it was very difficult to find anyone who actively expressed like for Clinton--the majority only backed her because of their opposition to Trump as earlier polls indicated. Clinton did not have the message of hope and change that Obama did, rather she was the face of the political establishment. She also could have been more active to incorporate disaffected voters, especially disgruntled white voters, in her message and platform. Trump spoke about disempowerment in society especially targeting white voters and was able to get people to vote who did not have prior inclinations to head to the ballot box. That is one reason why polls were wrong -- because they did not account for historically non-voting Americans and voters who were silent on their preferences. Finally, because of the American electoral system and generally low voter turnout, key states have outsized influence, and winning the presidency often comes down to winning particular constituencies and subsections of the populace and how one can galvanize those constituencies to vote en-mass.' 

Noting that the international community was concerned about the way Trump is to deal with the US international agreements including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (ANFTA), Mohseni said, 'This election has huge implications for traditional world institutions and global order. He has been openly critical of NATO and NAFTA—security and economic treaties that underpin much of the global order. Many of his close allies are critical of the UN and major international forums such as Davos. They are critical of globalized elites that place international elite interests ahead of national popular interests. In terms of the perspectives of other countries, those states who benefit from the current global status quo, such as China, Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states, and member states of the European Union, are worried about Trump. On the other hand, those states critical and opposed to status quo in the international political system such as Russia and Syria are more inclined towards Trump.

'It is not likely these treaties will be broken per se, but Trump is looking to renegotiate them and wants more in return with no free riders who benefit for American largesse. This attitude will increase costs for US allies and opens the door for greater influence of traditionally non-US allied states to have louder voices. It points to a continuation of President Obama’s foreign policies but perhaps with a more isolationist and nationalist streak.'

Commenting on the way Trump is to cooperate with Russia as a global partner, Mohseni noted, 'Trump will have a greater willingness to deal with Russia and accept it as a global partner. This message has been constant both before and after the elections. And it reflects Trump’s larger foreign policy thinking of greater isolationism, pragmatism, and power-sharing. In Syria, especially if Iran and Russia win the battle of Aleppo by the time of Trump’s inauguration, Trump will have no other option than to deal with Iran and Russia. In other words, structural factors will constrain Trump’s options in Syria, and the US will be more likely to focus on a diplomatic solution. Nevertheless, this would tie into Trump’s larger foreign policy agenda on the global order and Russia as well.'

Referring to Trump's regional policies and the comments he had made during his presidential campaigns about the landmark nuclear deal between Iran and the world six major powers which is also known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Mohseni said, 'Trump is not as close to Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf Arab monarchies as Clinton was. Thus, the regional rebalancing of power in the region that began under Obama will continue. There are, however, bigger questions around what policies regarding Iran will be, and how much Trump will ratchet up sanctions on Iran or undermine JCPOA. Trump’s Iran policies are still very uncertain but a lot of his staff, advisers, and constituency are very anti-Iran and were staunchly opposed to the JCPOA. It will be unlikely for Trump to tear up the agreement, but he will look to renegotiating aspects of the deal with Iran. What this means and how it will proceed is uncertain. US policy options against Iran are constrained, and neither military action nor sanctions will have much marginal benefit. It depends on Trump’s larger vision of dealing with Iran. On one hand, this may mean greater antagonism towards Iran, but on the other, it may mean Trump is interested in opening up Iran to US businesses and industry. Greater antagonism particularly with respect to the JCPOA will be met with international resistance, from not only Russia and China but also the Europeans. However, the possibility that Trump will allow his Republican allies to ramp up sanctions is also a real possibility. The question is how much Trump’s foreign policy vision and decision-making can overcome the resistance it would likely face within his own inner circle of power.'